There is a vast difference between Chamberlin's appeasement, occurring before any shots had been fired at or by Great Britain, and the war in Ukraine in which hundreds of thousands have already died with little evidence of imminent Ukrainian victory. In the early going it was reasonable to believe the Ukrainians could, with our help, rep…
There is a vast difference between Chamberlin's appeasement, occurring before any shots had been fired at or by Great Britain, and the war in Ukraine in which hundreds of thousands have already died with little evidence of imminent Ukrainian victory. In the early going it was reasonable to believe the Ukrainians could, with our help, repel the invasion. But, sanctions have not sufficiently crippled Putin; adding layer upon layer of advanced weapons systems have not turned the tide; the Ukrainian offensives into the Donbas and across the border into Russia stalled; Ukraine faces a recruiting crises; Ukraine's public infrastructure continues to be degraded; the Europeans continue to talk big and do little; Putin still does not face a meaningful opposition within Russia. In that context, negotiated peace that includes distasteful concessions may be disappointing but they are not the same as appeasement. As Ecclesiastes says "there is a time for war and a time for peace."
The state of peace in Europe should always be primarily the highest priority of Europeans. The U.S. should act in its own interests and not indemnify European countries to the extent that they do not take seriously nor commit to their own defense. It is up to them to present a credible deterrent. The "end game" options as far as Ukraine is concerned are to continue with more of the same war, which will ultimately result in its destruction; to convince NATO to escalate in dramatic fashion with the attendant risks; or to settle for a negotiated peace based upon the cards each side holds. The latter, by the reality on the ground, does not include Russian retreat from Donbas and Crimea. It is unrealistic to presume otherwise. The moral high ground cannot be imposed on a belligerent who holds the military high ground.
There is a vast difference between Chamberlin's appeasement, occurring before any shots had been fired at or by Great Britain, and the war in Ukraine in which hundreds of thousands have already died with little evidence of imminent Ukrainian victory. In the early going it was reasonable to believe the Ukrainians could, with our help, repel the invasion. But, sanctions have not sufficiently crippled Putin; adding layer upon layer of advanced weapons systems have not turned the tide; the Ukrainian offensives into the Donbas and across the border into Russia stalled; Ukraine faces a recruiting crises; Ukraine's public infrastructure continues to be degraded; the Europeans continue to talk big and do little; Putin still does not face a meaningful opposition within Russia. In that context, negotiated peace that includes distasteful concessions may be disappointing but they are not the same as appeasement. As Ecclesiastes says "there is a time for war and a time for peace."
So what is the end game? What is the state of peace in Europe when the guns fall silent?
The state of peace in Europe should always be primarily the highest priority of Europeans. The U.S. should act in its own interests and not indemnify European countries to the extent that they do not take seriously nor commit to their own defense. It is up to them to present a credible deterrent. The "end game" options as far as Ukraine is concerned are to continue with more of the same war, which will ultimately result in its destruction; to convince NATO to escalate in dramatic fashion with the attendant risks; or to settle for a negotiated peace based upon the cards each side holds. The latter, by the reality on the ground, does not include Russian retreat from Donbas and Crimea. It is unrealistic to presume otherwise. The moral high ground cannot be imposed on a belligerent who holds the military high ground.
Well said!